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In March 2016, I had the opportunity to attend three weeks of rehearsals for the reconstruction of 
one of Merce Cunningham’s most controversial works, Winterbranch, at the Lyon Opera Ballet.1 
Winterbranch was choreographed for the Merce Cunningham Dance Company’s first major tour 
and was first performed in New York, just before the tour began, in 1964. It is a work that fell out 
of the Merce Cunningham Dance Company’s repertory fairly early, perhaps because it was too 
firmly connected not only to a particular phase in the development of Cunningham’s aesthetic but 
also to the particular historical moment known as “the 60s” when the relation of art to context—
especially political context—was on everyone’s mind. 2  The Director of the Lyon Opera Ballet 
conceived of the Ballet’s spring program as an homage to the experimental dance of the 1960s; he 
chose to pair Winterbranch with Lucinda Childs’s Dance, a bright, brisk, almost antiseptic minimalist 
piece from 1979 that contrasts sharply with Cunningham’s somber, eery, and in some ways more 
engaged minimalist work. Jennifer Goggans, a former Cunningham dancer and presently an active 
reconstructor of his works, arrived in Lyon in mid-March to begin training the dancers in 
Cunningham technique. From the first day of rehearsals I was able to watch her guide Lyon’s 
balletically trained, exquisitely skilled dancers toward a performance of Winterbranch that, I believe, 
remained faithful to its rebarbative, even gritty nature, despite the unavoidable change in 
reception context.  
As chance would have it—and when working on Cunningham one is always attentive to chance—
while attending the rehearsals at the Lyon Opera I was also working on a paper for a conference 
on the ethics of gesture, organized by the editor of this volume, Lucia Ruprecht; a conference that 
would center on questions raised by Giorgio Agamben in his famous essay, “Notes on Gesture” 
(2000, 49–59; 1996, 45–53). Naturally, my two objects of study—Winterbranch and the ethics of 
gesture—began to enter into dialogue. The juxtaposition encouraged a comparison between 
Agamben’s and Cunningham’s respective approaches to the semiotics of dance, the way that dance 
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can generate meaning but also evade meaning in a way that Agamben deems “proper” to the 
“ethical sphere” (2000, 56). For Agamben, dance is composed of what he calls “gestures” that have 
“nothing to express” other than expressivity itself as a “power” unique to humans who have 
language (“Languages and Peoples”) (2000, 68). For Cunningham, dance is composed of what he 
calls “actions”, or at other times “facts”—discrete and repeatable movements sketched in the air 
that reveal the “passion,” the raw or naked “energy” of human expressivity before that energy has 
been directed toward a specific expressive project (1997, 86). I will look more closely at what 
Cunningham means by “actions,” and to what extent they can be considered “gestures” in 
Agamben’s terms; I will also explore the “ethical sphere” opened by the display of mediality, the 
“being-in-a-medium” of human beings (“The Face”) (2000, 57). But for the moment I want simply to 
note that for both, dance involves the exposure on stage of an energy or, in Agamben’s terms, a 
“power” (potere) (“The Face”) (2000, 95), that derives from the fundamentally “communicative 
nature of human beings,” their “linguistic nature” (“Languages and Peoples”) (2000, 68).3 In addition, 
the exposure of this communicative energy as energy has, for both, important emancipatory, even 
utopian implications. That said, the choreographer and philosopher understand the ethics of 
dance in slightly different terms. The following essay constitutes my effort to understand how 
these terms differ. I seek to clarify what Cunningham shares with Agamben’s neo-
phenomenological approach to gesture but also the nuance he brings to the philosophical table as 
a choreographer—that is, as someone who works through and with movement as a theoretical 
tool.  
Few scholars have been attentive to Agamben’s interest in dance per se. This may be because 
Agamben’s interest in dance is motivated neither by a deep knowledge of dance history nor by a 
fascination with the work of a particular choreographer. 4  Rather, his interest stems from an 
intuition that danced gestures throw into relief what is gestural in the gesture, its “media character” 
(2000, 57)—and mediality, as we shall see, ensures the ethical, or relational sphere of the human. 
Likewise, in the parallel universe of dance studies, very little has been written on Winterbranch as 
a study of gesture, although it has been recognized that, perhaps more than most of Cunningham’s 
dances, Winterbranch solicits on the part of the audience the act of interpretation, that is, its 
gestures appear to spectators as charged with specific meanings. Indeed, if there is a dance in 
Cunningham’s repertory that conjures an ethical sphere, it is Winterbranch. Juxtaposing 
Winterbranch with Agamben’s writings on gesture allows for an exploration of critical theory 
through a specific example of choreographic practice. Such a juxtaposition urges us to question 
precisely what a dance gesture is, and whether gesture is in essence an exposure of 
“communicability itself” (Agamben 2000, 83). What do dance gestures expose that ordinary 
gestures do not? Why would such an exposure be “ethical” in Agamben’s terms? And why would 
(his notion of) the ethical rely on a stage? 
Part I: Agamben on Gesture 
The first thing one notes when approaching Agamben’s “Notes on Gesture” is the fluidity or 
vagueness of the term “gesture.” By “gesture” Agamben does not necessarily mean a 
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communicative gesture, such as a thumbs up or a hand extended. Nor is he talking about 
functional gestures à la Leroi-Gourhan—elements of a chaîne opératoire or a “habitus.”5 Instead, I 
think Agamben is getting at a larger category of gestures that, at least in their familiar, non-
spectacular contexts, disclose a project or an intention (to use a Sartrean vocabulary), gestures that 
are part of an “intentional arc” (Merleau-Ponty’s term), that “always refer beyond” themselves “to a 
whole” of which they are “a part” (Agamben 2000, 54).6 This category includes locomotion, which is 
not traditionally understood by dancers as gestural. Rudolf Laban, for instance, considered 
“gestures” to be an affair of the upper body and separated them from “steps.” “Steps,” constitute a 
large group encompassing all one can do with the feet—advance, turn, hop, leap, and so on, 
whereas a “port-de-bras” and an “épaulement” are gestures in Laban’s sense of the term (see Laban 
1960). 
In contrast, Agamben appears to believe that dance—in its totality—is the ultimate gesture. In 
“Notes on Gesture,” he asserts that dance “exhibits” in exemplary fashion what is gestural in the 
gesture: “If dance is gesture, it is so, rather, because it is nothing more than the endurance and the 
exhibition of the media character of corporal movements” (57). “The gesture,” he italicizes, “is the 
exhibition of a mediality: it is the process of making a means visible as such” (57). Dance, it would 
appear, distills, in aestheticized, heightened form what the essence of gesture is, namely, a medium 
that exposes itself as such. But how does a medium expose itself as such? What is it in dance that 
allows it to be the site of such an exhibition? 
To begin to answer this question, we need to refer to a lesser known essay that, to my knowledge, 
has only appeared in a French version, “Le Geste et la danse.” 7  The essay reiterates certain 
passages found in “Notes on Gesture”—it was published the same year, 1992—while emphasizing 
different terms. Here, gesture appears as a kind of power (in French, “pouvoir” or “puissance”), a 
power of “expression.” Linking the two essays, Agamben writes that the most precise definition he 
can give of the “pouvoir du geste”—or the power that is gesture—is the power to expose itself as 
“pure moyen” (pure means). “Ce qui dans chaque expression, reste sans expression,” he 
underscores, “est geste” (That which in each act of expression remains unexpressed is gesture) 
(12). Another way to say this would be that gesture, in its ideal state (before being subordinated to 
what Agamben calls elsewhere “a paralyzing power”) is the embodiment of a force or “dynamis” 
(2000, 55, 54). Gesture is the medium of movement; it is movement as a medium, a kind of kinetic 
surface of inscription, as opposed to other media or supports, such as the painted image or the 
written word. Gesture exhibits the movement that is mediality—crossing over, traversing space, 
connecting points, communicating. 
Insofar as gestures move, are themselves movement, they represent for Agamben the very 
opposite of the static image. In Means Without End, the static image is associated with all that is 
“stiffened” or hardened—an “image” (“Notes on Gesture”), a “character” (“The Face”), or a 
“spectacle” as commodity (“Marginal Commentaries on The Society of the Spectacle”) (2000). In 
contrast, gesture is associated with all that is dynamic, fluid—in short, mediamnic, understood as 
both support and in-between, intervalic.8 In his essay “The Face,” for instance, the “face” plays the 
same role as gesture; it is a “revelation of language itself.” “Such a revelation,” he proposes, “does 
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not have any real content and does not tell the truth about this or that state of being, about this or 
that aspect of human beings and of the world: it is only opening, only communicability. To walk in 
the light of the face means to be this opening—and to suffer it, and to endure it” (2000, 91). In 
contrast, a “character” is produced when the face “stiffens,” when it must protect itself from the 
vulnerability, the openness and lack of finitude that is its nature (96). The “face” is thus like gesture, 
which also “suffers” and “endures,” or which is the process of suffering or enduring one’s medial 
character, one’s existence as a surface or support of communication.  
As has been noted, Agamben’s understanding of the ethical is very close to that of Emmanuel 
Levinas, whose chapter “Ethics and the Face” (1979) is clearly an important influence on many of 
the essays in Means Without End. Levinas maintains here that the ways in which human beings 
appear to one another (their “face,” but also all signifying surfaces and supports) are necessarily 
flawed; they communicate a message about the person, but they also hide what cannot be 
communicated, what is not exhausted in the act of communication. The “face” both exposes and 
betrays; it is “proper” and “improper” (Agamben 2000, 96–7). The exposure of this insufficiency or 
impropriety in the signs that bear us is itself an ethical—even a “political”—act, for it implies that 
what is known of the human is never complete, that human mediality—our capacity to become 
sign—is endless: “The task of politics is to return appearance itself to appearance, to cause 
appearance itself to appear” (“The Face”) (2000, 94). Agamben mirrors Levinas when he writes in 
“Kommerell, or On Gesture” that one gestures at the point where language appears “at a loss” 
(1999, 78). Other essays in Means without End make a similar point from a more politicized angle. 
For instance, in “Marginal Notes on commentaries on the Society of the Spectacle,” Agamben is 
concerned with the means and relations of production that prevent such an exposure of “loss.” He 
describes capitalist modes of spectacle that reduce gestures to flat, immobilized appearances 
severed from the unpredictable continuum of intentions that once animated them. Gestures, he 
claims, have become pure image; they appear on a screen, limitlessly appropriable, combinatorial. 
If “Marginal Notes” is concerned with the spectacularization of gestures, Agamben presents the 
opposite scenario in “The Face” and “What is a camp?” Here, in the fascist version of the same 
predicament, the human being is seized as raw life lacking the capacity to become image, to 
become something legible in the currency of the other (114–5). The human being is reduced to pure 
self-identity, incapable of circulating as a sign, and thus no longer a “being-in-a-medium”—no 
longer human—at all. Thus, if in “Marginal Notes,” the danger is that human beings will be reduced 
to pure surface, “stiffened” into a circulating sign or commodity form, in “The Face” and “What is a 
camp?” the danger is that human beings will be robbed of that very surface-generating capacity: 
they will be seized as “nature” tout court and thus deprived of their “linguistic nature,” their 
“mediality.” 
In this context we should recall that for Agamben gesture is always related not simply to the act of 
bearing but also, like the face, to the process of exposing, or exhibiting. The Italian terms Agamben 
employs are “esporre”—which means both “express” and “exhibit” and “esibizione,” a “show,” 
“display,” or “performance” (1996, 52–3, 51). We can begin to understand why Agamben privileges 
gesture, and dance gesture in particular. As movement, gesture exceeds dynamically its signifying 
or operational functions. It is highly visible—kinetically and optically—and thus ideal for “making a 
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means visible as such.” Agamben’s examples of the gesture include ambulation (the gait), 
Warburg’s pathosformel (or dynamograms) (1999, 89–103), the mime gestures of the Commedia 
del’Arte (1999, 77–85), “everyday gestures” (1999, 83), and of course dance gestures, or dance as a 
series of gestures. Speech, too, can be gestural, just as there is in gesture something of speech. As 
he insists, gesture “is not an absolutely non-linguistic element,” it points to that “stratum of 
language that is not exhausted in communication...” (1999, 77; my emphasis). In all these cases, what 
makes gesture gesture is that it carries something forward that is not equivalent to, or reducible 
to, sense. As Agamben stresses, gesture “has precisely nothing to say” (2000, 58).9 To expose this 
gestural quality of the act of communication—which is not exhausted by semantics—is to open the 
“ethical dimension” (2000, 57). The fact that many of his examples of gestures capable of opening 
that ethical dimension are those that occur on stage suggests the degree to which exposing relies 
on performing. Twice-behaved behavior, gestures on stage, exemplify the act—in both the practical 
and theatrical senses of the word—that “cause[s] appearance itself to appear” (2000, 94). 
Part II: From the Ethics of Gesture to the Ethics of Dance 
But why does dance embody that act of exposure par excellence? What are the ethics—or, in 
another version, the politics—of the gesture that is dance? 10  Let us recall that dance enters 
Agamben’s account at precisely the moment when “human beings [...] have lost every sense of 
naturalness,” when they have “lost [their] gestures” (2000, 52). Despite the emerging domination 
of capitalist relations which “stiffen” gestures, dance remains an instrument of liberation, or at least 
a form of critical nostalgia for a time when gestures were both natural and under the subject’s 
control. If, by the twentieth century, an entire generation has “lost its gestures,” then how is it that 
the gestures of dancers have managed to escape this pathological condition? 
A glance in the direction of Agamben’s source for his understanding of dance (and its relation to 
historical periods) might help us answer this question. Agamben may very well have been 
influenced by the work of Susanne Langer, whose Feeling and Form of 1953 was one of the first 
important philosophical treatments of dance. Agamben seems to refer indirectly to Langer’s book 
when he turns to dance in “Notes on Gesture”:  
The dance of Isadora Duncan and Sergei Diaghilev, the novels of Proust, the great 
Jugendstil poetry from Pascoli to Rilke, and, finally and most exemplarily, the silent 
movie trace the magic circle in which humanity tried for the last time to evoke what 
was slipping through its fingers forever. (2000, 52–3; my emphasis) 
The phrase “the magic circle” is one that Agamben might have borrowed from Langer, who in turn 
borrowed it from a text by Mary Wigman (Langer 1953, 188–207).11 Langer in fact titles a chapter 
“The Magic Circle,” referring to what Curt Sachs hypothesized was the oldest dance form, the circle 
dance (1953, 190). Within this circle, human beings first recognized the “terrible and fecund Powers 
that surround” them and that enter their very bodies, transforming them into a source of 
movement power (196). Basing much of her argument on Sachs, Langer describes the “magic 
circle” as implicit in all forms of dance, both “primitive” and contemporary. Today, secular or 
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ballroom dance, she states, “enthrall the dancer almost instantly in a romantic unrealism,” whereas 
“primitive” dance achieves the ecstatic “by weaving the ‘magic circle’ around the altar of the deity, 
whereby every dancer is exalted at once to the status of a mystic” (196). What Langer calls “virtual 
gesture”—meaning gesture that has been lifted out of its “common usage” and placed on the 
stage—is “the appearance of Power” (52, 198). Dance exhibits the “magnetic forces that unite a 
group” when dancers exhibit this “Power” as such (202). 
Agamben might have called on Langer’s (and Sachs’s) notion of the “magic circle” to evoke a break 
between a pre-modern and a modern relation to gesture. Like Agamben, Langer also maintains 
that a loss has occured. In modernity, although the “magic around the altar” has been broken, 
modern dance in particular is still animated with that “Power,” it is still serving the same function 
(207). However, she qualifies, “we”—the moderns—”evoke [that same Power] with full knowledge 
of its imaginary status” (206). Langer’s words help us understand why Agamben strings together 
turn-of-the-century dance (e.g., “Duncan and Diaghilev”) with Proust and Rilke, for they share—at 
least according to Agamben—a nostalgia for an experience that has moved from the realm of ritual 
communion to the realm of the stage (an “imaginary status” [206]). However, Agamben departs 
from the type of primitivist rhetoric that Langer could be accused of perpetuating when he insists 
that gesture contains a linguistic element, that it is “closely tied to language,” to “the stratum of 
language that is not exhausted in communication” (1999, 77).12 Presumably, then, dance would not 
be any more primitive than language itself; and yet, as visibly and undeniably movement, it 
promises to expose more dramatically that which moves in language, the inexhaustible “stratum” 
that language is “at a loss” to convey. It is perhaps for this reason that in “Le Geste et la danse,” 
instead of evoking what has been irrevocably lost, dance exemplifies what is not lost—at least not 
to dance—that which dance alone can continue to exhibit, namely, the human potential to be a 
“milieu pur” (2000, 57). 13  Agamben presents concert dance in particular as the last refuge of 
“communicability”: “Ce qui dans chaque expression, reste sans expression, est geste. Mais ce qui, dans 
chaque expression, reste sans expression, c’est l’expression elle-même, le moyen expressif en tant 
que tel” (That which in each act of expression remains without expression, is gesture. But that which, 
in each expression, remains without expression, is expression itself, the means of expression as 
such). Dance gestures, it would appear, are a hypostatized form of gesture, or the gestural; they 
evoke that “Power” (Langer) to express a world, to have a world, the “Power” that is our “linguistic 
nature” and that holds us within the “magic circle” of the human. Sounding much like Langer, 
Agamben concludes “Le Geste et la danse” by affirming that “la danse des danseurs qui dansent 
ensemble sur une scène est l’accomplissement de leur habilité à la danse et de leur puissance de 
danser en tant que puissance” (the dance of dancers who dance together on a stage is the 
accomplishment of their skill in dancing and their power to dance as power) (12; my emphasis).  
It is not clear to me that in “Le Geste et la danse” Agamben has provided a convincing portrait of 
dance, or that he has revealed its nature as a gestural form “closely tied to language” (not “not 
linguistic”) (1999, 77; my emphasis). In his treatment, dance retains too much of its relation to a 
primitive, pre-verbal world of ritual, even if only from the perspective of a modernist “imaginary.” 
What is perhaps more useful for our purposes—especially as we move toward a reading of 
Winterbranch—is Agamben’s account of how the gesturality of the gesture is exposed, that is, how 
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“le moyen expressif en tant que tel” (the means of expression as such) might be made to appear. 
Ironically, in “Notes on Gesture” he associates such an appearance or display with the act of 
interruption, not with the fluid movements of the dancer, bathing blissfully in the “milieu pur” of a 
“power to dance as power.” To close this part of my argument, and to prepare for my reading of 
Winterbranch, let us return briefly to a passage in which Agamben takes up the example of the 
pornographic, the gestures of which can be suspended, he argues, to reveal their intrinsic and 
irreducible “mediality”: 
The gesture is the exhibition of a mediality: it is the process of making a means visible as 
such [original emphasis]. It allows the emergence of the being-in-a-medium of 
human beings and thus it opens the ethical dimension for them. But, just as in a 
pornographic film, people caught in the act of performing a gesture that is simply a 
means addressed to the end of giving pleasure to others (or to themselves) are 
kept suspended in and by their own mediality—for the only reason of being shot 
and exhibited in their mediality—and can become the medium of a new pleasure 
for the audience (a pleasure that would otherwise be incomprehensible) [my 
emphasis]... so what is relayed to human beings in gestures is not the sphere of an 
end in itself but rather the sphere of pure and endless mediality. (2000, 57–8) 
I would like to keep in mind this scene as we move forward, one in which the ethical dimension 
appears to open within the pornographic, one in which something “pure” and without end is 
captured in a filmed act that obviously has a very concrete end. As opposed to his brief excursus 
on dance, which confuses dancing with an uninterrupted “magic circle,” Agamben’s comments on 
film (and the pornographic film in particular) allow us a firmer purchase on what dance, as a form 
of gesture, might be—and what it might be able to accomplish, or expose. Here, also, instead of 
indulging in the fantasy of the “en tant que tel” (as such), and the “moyen pur” (pure means), 
Agamben suggests, albeit obliquely, that a means is never pure, that it can in fact never be exposed 
as “an end in itself,” and that the means is itself mediated by what it bears. That is, it is mediality only 
insofar as it is actively mediating.  
In sum, what is interesting and revealing about this passage on the pornographic film is that, as in 
“The Face,” Agamben opens the ethical dimension not at the point where communication is lost, 
but rather at the point where saying “something in common” (the clearly legible pornographic 
gesture) and saying “nothing” (the gesture interrupted, exposed as a gesture) occur simultaneously 
(“Form of Life”) (2000, 9). He points us toward that ambiguous point where a narrative unfolds and 
yet that narrative is suspended, revealing a “stratum” “not exhausted” by a narrative (1999, 77), a 
point where the communication is interrupted, yet still “endured.”.  
I believe that it is in this type of suspension—understood as a medium—that Agamben’s ethics of 
gesture resides. In the next section I will argue that it is in this type of suspension that we might 
discover Cunningham’s ethics of gesture as well. 
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Part III. The Cunningham Gesture 
As is well known, Cunningham often expressed 
his intention to create dances that would not 
impose a particular interpretation on his 
audience: “We don’t attempt to make the 
individual spectator think a certain way,” he 
stated in a 1979 interview: “I do think each 
spectator is individual, that it isn’t a public. Each 
spectator as an individual can receive what we do 
in his own way and need not see the same thing, 
or hear the same thing, as the person next to him” 
(Cunningham and Lesschaeve 2009, 171–2). 14 
Earlier, in 1968, Cunningham had already 
advanced a similar view: dance “can and does 
evoke all sorts of individual responses in the 
single spectator” (1968, n.p.). “Any idea as to 
mood, story, or expression entertained by the 
spectator is a product of his mind, his feelings” 
(1970, 175). 
Cunningham’s resistance to conventional plot-
lines and psychological interpretations is well 
known. Influenced, as was John Cage, by the 
reception theory of Marcel Duchamp, 
Cunningham aimed to address—and thus 
create—a spectator who would “complete” the work (see Duchamp 1975). This was in large part a 
reaction against what he saw around him in the dance of the 1940s: “It was almost impossible,” he 
wrote in 1968, “to see a movement in modern dance during that period not stiffened by literary or 
personal connection” (1968, n.p.; quoted in Vaughan 1997, 69). In an effort to avoid imposing 
literary or personal connections, Cunningham developed a set of procedures that would ensure, 
at least in principle, that his own intentions, his “personal connections,” would not shape or “stiffen” 
the movement material. Since many compositional decisions would be taken out of his hands, he 
could with some justification insist that meanings generated by viewers were theirs alone. Some 
critics took this to mean that there was no expressive content to his dances.15 John Martin wrote 
in a dismissive review of 1950 that there is “little in content and nothing of conspicuous formal 
value” in Cunningham’s dances (1950, 69) while Doris Hering lamented in 1954 that his chance 
compositions were like “tired utterances suspended in an emotionless void” (1954, 69). And yet 
Cunningham was quite clear on this point: his goal was not to suppress the expressivity of his 
dancers but quite the opposite, to intensify that expressivity, to expose on stage not “anger” or 
“joy,” but rather what he called the pure undifferentiated “source of energy out of which may be 
channelled the energy that goes into the various emotional behaviors” (1952; reprinted in Vaughan 
1997, 86). “Dance is not emotion, passion for her, anger against him. […] In its essence, in the 
Fig. 1: Carolyn Brown in Merce Cunningham, 
Winterbranch (1964), studio photograph by 
Jack Mitchell. Permissions to reproduce 
generously granted by Craig B. Highberger, 
Executive Director, Jack Mitchell Archives 
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nakedness of its energy it is a source from which passion or anger may issue in a particular form” 
(86; my emphasis). 
Here, Cunningham seems to anticipate Agamben, defining dance as a movement form that 
displays “the nakedness” of an “energy” drawn from “common pools of motor impulses” (in 
Vaughan 1997, 86), impulses presumably shared by human beings moving within the magic circle 
of communicability. But Cunningham also takes care to acknowledge the “particular form” in which 
that energy is exposed. For that reason, the “nakedness” to which he refers is not reducible to the 
purity evoked by the phrase “milieu pur” that Agamben borrows from Mallarmé.16 There is in fact 
something almost pornographic about Cunningham’s “nakedness,” “that blatant exhibiting of this 
energy,” as he puts it (in Vaughan 1997, 86). As I have argued elsewhere, Cunningham engages in 
an erotics of the not-quite-abstracted; he is keen to exhibit the dirt—the literal dirt, as we shall see 
in the case of Winterbranch—that clings to the movements of dancers like a semantic residue 
weighing them down (see Noland 2017). What makes Winterbranch a particularly interesting case 
to study in this regard is that the gestures the dancers perform are at once legible and inscrutable, 
related to specific operational and expressive tasks and yet disaggregated, distorted, interrupted. 
One could say that Winterbranch practices an ethics of gesture insofar as it suspends movement 
between an “impure” manifestation (“passion for her,” “anger against him”) and raw human kinesis 
imagined as a “pure” support. Put differently, the dance seems to play on the fine line between a 
“naked” and a “channelled” energy, between a “source” of emotion and emotion in a “particular 
form” (in Vaughan 1997, 86). While remaining mysterious and illegible, Winterbranch nonetheless 
inspires the act of interpretation, the search for meaning, and thus the attribution to movement of 
expressive content. During the 1960s and 1970s audience interpretations invariably indexed the 
sinister, even apocalyptic tone of the piece and the task-like nature of the movement content. But 
just what is this movement content and to what extent can it be considered gestural? 
One of the obstacles we face when moving from philosophy to choreography, from Agamben to 
Cunningham, is lexical in nature. Cunningham uses many terms to refer to what Agamben calls the 
“gestures” of dance: “actions,” “facts,” “movements,” and “gestures.” He often has recourse to the 
word “gesture” to refer to the “ordinary” gesture one finds in the street, task-related gestures (such 
as potting a plant), 17  and even “intimate gesture[s]” that convey a feeling (Cunningham and 
Lesschaeve 2009, 106). Speaking of Signals (1970), for instance, he notes that a movement of one 
of his dancers suddenly struck him as an “intimate gesture,” although he had not intended it to be 
so (106). The particular combination of dancers and the particular place the movement appeared 
in the sequence made it look like a gesture of intimacy shared between partners: “you don’t have 
to decide that this is an intimate gesture,” Cunningham states, “but you do something, and it 
becomes so” (106; my emphasis). This tells us something about Cunningham as an observer (rather 
than a creator) of gestures: he is able to acknowledge the evocative—even conventionally 
expressive—quality of a danced gesture. Moreover, as the anecdote suggests, he is interested in 
that evocative gesture, especially if it suggests a relationship (and thus a scenario or drama). For 
him, a movement has the status of a gesture when it is eloquent of a relation (whether “found” or 
developed by the dancers), or when, alternatively, it mimes or actually completes a specific task. In 
sum, the word “gesture” in Cunningham’s vocabulary references both a task-like, “ordinary” 
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movement and an expressive movement. Cunningham recognizes that gestures have a signifying 
dimension insofar as they are part of a culturally legible situation. 
Yet “gestures” are simultaneously technical building blocks, movements to be placed in an array 
and thus removed from the contexts in which they either say something (in a system of meaning) 
or do something (in a habitus). The purpose of the grids, lists, and chance procedures that 
Cunningham developed over the course of his career was to reveal through recombination new 
local contexts in which decontextualized human actions might be viewed. Cunningham puts it this 
way in Changes: “you do not separate the human being from the actions he does, or the actions 
which surround him, but you can see what it is like to break these actions up in different ways” (1968, 
n.p.). To “break up” an action is to interrupt it. It is to expose the modality of movement, the tonus 
or type of effort supporting the intention. In short, to “break up” an action is to seek contact with 
the “nakedness” of an energy underlying “passion for her [...] anger against him” (1952; reprinted 
in Vaughan 1997, 86). It is to interrupt the flow of gestures, to expose the support that gesture is—
in Agamben’s terms—that gesture is as such. It is also, as Cunningham puts it, to take the ground 
away from beneath the feet of the spectators, to shift them toward an “abyss” where conventional 
associations no longer function: 
I think that dance at its best [...] produces an indefinable and unforgettable abyss 
in the spectator. It is only an instant, and immediately following that instant the 
mind is busy [...] the feelings are busy [...] But there is that instant, and it does renew 
us. (Cunningham in Dalva ed. 2007, n.p.) 
The question remains, though, whether such suspension over an “abyss” opens the ethical 
dimension or whether instead that dimension opens as one crosses the abyss, in an interval that 
also promises connection. Winterbranch is a study of what happens when one “breaks up” an 
action—in this case, the action of falling. A fall can be broken, cinematically interrupted, but a falling 
body inevitably lands. 
Part IV. Falling in Winterbranch 
Winterbranch dates from a phase in Cunningham’s career when he was less interested in 
incorporating “ordinary gestures” than in investigating what the fundamentals of a dance 
vocabulary might be.18 In the early 1960s, he began to focus on what he called “facts in dancing”: 
“I have a tendency to deal with what I call the facts in dancing,” he explained to David Vaughan, his 
archivist (Vaughan 1997, 135).19 Influenced, perhaps, by the Classical Hindu Rasa theory of the 
“eight permanent emotions,” he sought to reduce his vocabulary to a set of eight essential 
movement varieties, without, however, attaching any particular emotive value to them. We find in 
the “Choreographic Records” for Crises (1960), for instance, the following list: “Bend /Rise /Extend 
/Turn /Glide /Dart /Jump /Fall” (box 3, box 11, Cunningham, n.d.). After identifying these eight 
“facts,” the choreographer then declined them into sub-categories, thus exploring systematically 
the anatomical possibilities of the human body. Here, Cunningham exemplifies the “materialist” 
sensibility of John Cage and the composers of “la musique concrète” who maintained that the 
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materials of a craft could be enumerated in a non-hierarchical, a-semantic taxonomy with no 
reference to their value in a harmonic system. In Cunningham’s “The Impermanent Art” we hear 
an echo of Cage’s aesthetics as they are presented in “Lecture on Something” (1959). Cage: “each 
something is really what it is.” Cunningham: 
A thing is just that thing […]. In dance, it is the simple fact of a jump being a jump, 
and the further fact of what shape the jump takes [my emphasis]. This attention given 
the jump eliminates the necessity to feel that the meaning of dancing lies in 
everything but the dancing, and further eliminates cause-and-effect worry as to 
what movement should follow what movement, frees one’s feelings about 
continuity, and makes it clear that each act of life can be its own history: past, 
present and future, and can be so regarded, which helps to break the chains that 
too often follow dancers’ feet around.” (Reprinted in Vaughan 1997, 86) 
For Winterbranch, Cunningham chose to focus not on the “jump” but rather on the “Fall.”20 The 
dance is composed of eighteen sections, each of which centers on a different way of falling 
(Winterbranch “Choreographic Records,” Cunningham, n.d.). However, when he writes in the 
passage above that the “simple fact of a jump” is complicated by a “further fact”—namely,” “what 
shape the jump takes”—he departs from a strict Cagean materialism. That the first “fact” has to be 
accompanied by a “further fact” (a movement has to be realized by a particular person in a 
particular sequence) indicates that the categories of movement themselves are “facts” only in a 
virtual sense. That is, they exist as classes of physical action to be actualized in a particular 
phenomenalized “shape.” Even in a classroom exercise,, “a “Bend,” for instance, is contoured by 
the movement that comes before and the movement that follows; “a “pré-mouvement,” as Hubert 
Godard terms it, anticipates and orients what will come next (Ginot and Marcel eds. 1998, 224–9). 
That is why the movement’s place in a sequence is so vital to the manner in which it will be 
performed, and thus to the manner in which it will strike the eye. Just as the “fact” of extending a 
hand to the sternum of one’s partner might, as in Signals, become “a “gesture” recognized as 
“intimate,” so too a “Bend” “Twist,” or “Fall” might be phenomenalized as a gesture resonant with 
expressive, dramatic, even semantic force when executed in a particular sequence by a particular 
dancer and under the unique conditions of a theatrical performance. As Jill Johnston wrote 
succinctly in 1963, in a Cunningham dance “the gesture is the performer; the performer is the 
gesture” (10). 
Thus, what Cunningham calls “the attention given the jump” excludes neither his interest in nor his 
desire to solicit the input of the individual dancer. On the contrary, such attention (cultivated in the 
dancer as well) allows each one to discover and reveal his or her singularity: “from the beginning I 
tried to look at the people I had, and see what they did and could do... You can’t expect this one to 
dance like the other one. You can give them the same movement and then see how each does it 
in relationship to himself, to his being, not as a dancer but as a person” (Cunningham and 
Lesschaeve 2009, 65).21 Especially during the 1950s and 1960s, Cunningham was acutely attuned 
to the movement qualities as well as the personalities of his dancers. In fact, he often began the 
choreographic process by compiling “a “gamut” of movements—one gamut for each dancer—that 
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would serve as the fundamental movement vocabulary for the piece, thus taking full advantage of 
the unique “shapes” each dancer tended to make when actualizing the dancing “fact.”  
However, Winterbranch is concerned less with highlighting the qualities of a particular dancer than 
with the “Fall,” one of the eight movement “facts” on Cunningham’s list. Cunningham explained to 
Jacqueline Lesschaeve that he “wanted to make a dance about falling” (Cunningham and 
Lesschaeve 2009, 101). So, quite simply, he “worked on falls” (101). first alone in the studio and 
then with the dancers he had in the Company at the time: Carolyn Brown, Viola Farber, Barbara 
Lloyd, William Davis, and Steve Paxton. In his account of the work he insists repeatedly that his 
main interest was in “the idea of bodies falling,” resisting the implication—made by Lesschaeve 
and others—that he had any other message in mind (Vaughan 1997, 137). While admitting that the 
dance caused “a “furor” whenever it was performed, he remains coy in the Lesschaeve interview, 
acknowledging but never validating the strong reactions to which it gave rise: 
In Sweden they said it was about race riots; in Germany they thought of 
concentration camps, in London they spoke of bombed cities; in Tokyo they said it 
was the atom bomb. A lady with us took care of the child [Benjamin Lloyd] who was 
on the trip. She was the wife of a sea captain and said it looked like a shipwreck to 
her [...]. Everybody was drawing on his own experience, whereas I had simply made 
a piece which was involved with falls, the idea of bodies falling. (Vaughan 1997, 135, 
137) 
Carolyn Brown, who danced in Winterbranch throughout the 1964 tour, writes in her autobiography 
Chance and Circumstance that “In Germany, interestingly, no one thought to liken Winterbranch to 
the Holocaust, although this happened regularly in other European countries” (2007, 389). 
Meanwhile, the reviewer for the London Times wrote that “Winterbranch is a disturbing work [...] 
The dancers, dressed in all-over black like wartime commandos, writhe and grope their way 
through gloom” (1964, 4). After a New York performance in 1967 Don McDonagh commented that 
Winterbranch had been “variously interpreted as a plea for civil rights and a shipwreck” (1976, 289). 
And Arlene Croce, reviewer for Ballet Review, wrote that “Winterbranch seems to me a pre-vision of 
hell” (1968, 25).22 But whether critics identified Winterbranch with Auschwitz, the battlefield, or hell, 
they all remarked on what Brown calls “the ethos of Winterbranch; darkness, foreboding, terror, 
devastation, alienation, doom” (2007, 477). 
Before proceeding to a closer analysis of the movement content of Winterbranch, we need to recall 
both the artistic and the political contexts of the work. With respect to the artistic context, 
Cunningham was in the process of assimilating developments in the New York dance scene, 
developments that—at least for a short period—caused him to rethink his dance vocabulary. 
Members of the Judson Dance Group, including Yvonne Rainer, Simone Forti, and Trisha Brown, 
started incorporating everyday and task movement into their works as early as July 1962 (see Banes 
1993). Simultaneously, the “Junk Art” and Fluxus movements of the 1960s encouraged the 
incorporation into performance and exhibition spaces of urban detritus and industrial waste.23 
Winterbranch reflects both these trends. Further, the directions that Cunningham gave to his 
Artistic Director of the time, Robert Rauschenberg, reveal the influence on his work of his own 
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personal experience. These directions are particularly precise, more detailed and explicit—and 
thus constraining—than Cunningham typically supplied. He even republished in Changes: Notes on 
Choreography elements of the letter he wrote to Rauschenberg in which he outlines his preferences 
for décor and lighting:  
The lighting is done freely each time, differently, so that the rhythms of the 
movements are differently accented and the shapes differently seen, partially or 
not at all. I asked robert rauschenberg [sic] to think of the light as though it were 
night instead of day. i don’t mean night as referred to in romantic pieces, but night 
as it is in our time with automobiles on highways, and flashlights in faces, and the 
eyes being deceived about shapes by the way the light hits them. There is a streak 
of violence in me...I was interested in the possibility of having a person dragged out 
of the area while lying or sitting down. (Reprinted in Vaughan 1997, 135–7) 
As Mark Franko has noted, the scene on the highway seems to be taken right out of Cunningham’s 
personal experience while touring in the infamous VW van with Rauschenberg, Cage, and his 
Company members (1992, 146; also see Cunningham and Lesschaeve 2009, 106). Responding to 
Cunningham’s directions, Rauschenberg invented a lighting arrangement that would approximate 
an experience of the highway at night he knew only too well, creating stark contrasts between total 
obscurity and blinding illumination by cueing the lightboard to follow an aleatory order of soft 
beams determined according to a chance algorithm that changed for each performance. For the 
music, Cunningham commissioned an original piece from La Monte Young, a composer who was 
very much in vogue at the time. Young offered 2 Sounds, a minimalist composition that has become 
over the years the object of a lively polemic. 2 Sounds juxtaposes a screechy tone, produced by 
dragging an ashtray against a mirror, with a more resonant low tone, produced by stroking a piece 
of wood across the surface of a Chinese gong. The first ten minutes of the dance are performed in 
absolute silence. Cunningham heightened the contrast between the silent beginning and the 
second half by amping up the volume of La Monte Young’s score to a decibel level that most 
spectators (and dancers) found—and still find—intolerable. Finally, Rauschenberg added a piece 
of junk art to the scenography, a combine composed of whatever he could find around the set at 
the time. (Don McDonagh describes it as “a strange little machine with winking lights... a cartoon 
version of an official police car.” [McDonagh 1976, 288–9]). Rauschenberg designed not only the 
sets and lighting but also the costumes; he chose to dress the dancers entirely in black with 
contrasting white sneakers on their feet. As for the make-up, Rauschenberg elaborated on the 
sneaker motif: he applied a black smudge under the eyes of each dancers, evoking in this way the 
protective stroke of black that football players apply when they have to play in a brightly-lit 
stadium. Significantly, during the rehearsals for the Opéra Ballet production in Lyon, Jennifer 
Goggans directed the dancers to scuff up and dirty the white sneakers as much as possible 
presumably to give the impression—as in the original production—of a grubby workspace, a stage 
graced only by the clutter of unused equipment in the back.  
Goggans’s explicit directive (to dirty the shoes) in the context of the 2016 reconstruction confirms 
that none of the directions Cunningham gave were indifferent or expendable. Clearly, he intended 
to create a frame for the movement, he wanted to conjure a very specific mood. Thus it was 
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misleading to state—as he did—that any association made by the spectators would be drawn “from 
individual experience” alone. The lighting, the grubby décor, the make-up, and the costumes all 
collude to render the “falls” of Winterbranch not simply “facts in dancing” but, more specifically, 
facts framed in a certain way. That frame—the menace of nighttime darkness—remains a constant 
throughout all performances of the piece. It is by no means insignificant that Winterbranch, when 
excerpted later on for an Event, was still performed in the original constumes and lighting; as dance 
critic Nancy Dalva notes perspicaciously in her 2005 review, of the Events at the Joyce Theater in 
New York, Winterbranch was 
presented in its own special outfits—namely black jumpsuits—and its own almost 
completely dark, glancing, harsh light. This was unusual for Events—I don’t know of 
any other dance for which this is done—when the material is usually stripped of its 
usual presentation context. (Dalva 2005, 18)24 
The question is, to what extent does the dance material for Winterbranch rely on this “presentation 
context”? Much of the choreography is period-specific; that is, we find in many of the dances of the 
1960s dance figures that evoke the workings of machines—pulleys, pistons, and levers. A trio that 
occurs near the end of Winterbranch is only a slight modification of a trio found in Crises (1960); the 
turning figures in which one dancer rolls over another prefigure similar figures found in 
Walkaround Time (1968). At the same time, the “presentation context” of Winterbranch encourages 
us to look at these figures and the gestures they contain not only as mechanical but also as task-
like, the variety of movement that would be accomplished under the flickering, irregular lighting of 
an apocalyptic landscape. At various points a dancer is dragged off the stage by means of a small 
square black rug; we witness the effort involved in tugging or carrying a body off stage and 
recognize the unmistakable silhouette of a still figure wrapped in a shroud and transported on a 
stretcher. The theme of the body as dead weight is thus impossible to miss, although this theme 
seems to be contrasted with another, that of the body as eloquent weight. It is as though 
Cunningham were exploring the difference between what Agamben calls “bare life” and “form-of-
life,” that is, between “naked life” and “a life that can never be separated from its form” (or “shape”) 
(2000, 2–3). On the one hand, the associations the audience makes with these figures—victims of 
a holocaust, sinners writhing in hell—are overdetermined by the context in which they are 
presented; on the other, the gestures as performed arguably project meanings that the 
scenography merely underscores.  
Consider, for instance, the opening of the dance. A male dancer—Cunningham, in the original 
production—traverses the stage from back stage left to back stage right lying on his back, wrapped 
tightly in a black tube that prevents him from using his arms. (During the rehearsals for the 2016 
reconstruction, Goggans referred to the tube as a “body bag.”) 25  In the original production, 
Cunningham held a flashlight so that while he slithered and writhed, the beam would light up 
different areas of the stage. The figure is thus at once a passive victim of the constraining bag and 
an active participant in setting the mood of the piece. Cunningham may have insisted that in 
choreographing Winterbranch he was merely interested in “the idea of falling,” but the many props 
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of the dance suggest that “the idea of falling” was—even for him—by no means denuded of 
symbolic implications.  
The following sections of the dance also 
emphasize the weight of the body, both 
as a thing to be manipulated and as a 
force to be countered or taken into 
account. Soon after the opening solo, a 
man and woman enter into a duet that 
resembles the awkward manoeuvres of a 
mechanical pulley: one serves as a 
counterweight to the other. The man 
holds the arm of the woman, who, to 
begin with, is lying on her side on the 
floor facing the audience. Little by little he 
succeeds in lifting her torso, head, and 
hips off the ground by leaning his feet 
against hers and pulling her toward him 
with all his force. As soon as the woman 
is upright, she begins to descend toward 
the other side, supported only by the counterweight of the man (see fig. 2). A few minutes later, 
the two dancers form a figure that resembles a rotating ball inside a socket (see fig. 3).  
In both cases (the pulley and the ball-and-
socket), the falls are carefully controlled; 
we observe a calculated and steady 
displacement of weight as the woman 
holds herself rigid, manipulated (but also 
protected) by the motions of the man. In 
the second phrase, however, which 
Cunningham referred to in his notes as 
the “twine roll,” the woman makes herself 
completely vulnerable, rolling over the 
back of the man, her back arched, 
exhibiting her pubis, stomach, chest and 
throat to the audience. Meanwhile, the 
man transforms himself into a support 
for her weight, bearing his burden (the 
woman) as he shifts her toward the 
ground (see fig. 3). 
The duet seems to juxtapose contrasting tonalities: we witness industry qualified by empathy, a 
task is executed with exquisite care. The slowness of the first apparition of the “twine-roll” (it will 
Fig. 2: Adrien Délépine and Kristina Bentz during a rehearsal 
of Winterbranch at the Opéra de Lyon, March 2017, 
photograph by Monick Dimonte. Permission to reproduce 
granted by photographer. 
Fig. 3: Noëllie Conjeaud and Raúl Serrano Nuñez performing 
“Twine Roll” in Merce Cunningham’s Winterbranch 
(screenshot from performance video attributed to Lyon 
Opera Ballet, 2016)] 
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be repeated twice) invites the specator to contemplate the skill of the dancers who are performing 
it. At one point during the rehearsals I asked one of the women who performed the “twine-roll,” 
Chaery Moon, what she thought the gestures meant, what she was imagining as she executed the 
phrase. Her answer was that she had no time to think about what her gestures might mean 
because the balancing operation was so difficult to execute. The challenge, she said, was to remain 
conscious of what her partner was doing at every moment, to adjust her movements to the micro-
adjustments of his back muscles, to attend to the slow but inexorable shifts of his weight beneath 
her prone frame. In order to avoid falling and injuring herself, she had to remain riveted on the 
incremental displacements of his weight, displacements that were always in response to her own 
redistributions of weight.  
On the one hand, Moon’s account implies that the relationship between the dancers was nothing 
more than a relation of weight. Of course, to some extent, this relation characterizes all dance duets 
(especially ones in which there are lifts), but this dancing “fact” is usually disguised by mannerisms 
or narrative contexts. During the rehearsals for the reconstruction, Goggans was careful to 
foreground this relation of weight. Presumably channelling Cunningham, she explicitly instructed 
the two dancers to avoid suggesting an amorous relation while performing the “twine-roll.” At one 
point, the male and female dancers (Mario Menendez and Chaery Moon) clasped hands as a way 
of maintaining their balance. Goggans swooped down to correct them, insisting that if they needed 
to hold hands to prevent themselves from falling they could do so but only if their gesture remained 
invisible to the audience. ‘Do it in such a way that no one sees you’re touching each other,’ she 
advised. To her mind, at least, any rapport between dancers that might emerge over the course of 
the rehearsals had to be muted; any plot that could be projected had to be suppressed.  
The “twine-roll” appears twice more in the course of Winterbranch. The second time we encounter 
this phrase it is executed by three couples simultaneously at a brisker pace. The third and last time 
the “twine-roll” appears in the dance it is performed at a much faster pace. As a result, the woman 
in each couple is destabilized, caught off balance. Unable to calibrate her movements to those of 
the man beneath her, she comes crashing down to the floor. Each appearance of the “twine-roll” 
is thus distorted either by slow motion or acceleration, indicating that Cunningham was indeed 
interested in seeing how a “fact in dancing” could appear each time in a different “shape.” 
Throughout the 1950s and 60s, deceleration and acceleration were among the means Cunningham 
used to detach a potentially signifying gesture from a particular context. Cunningham had other 
means at his disposal as well, such as the breaking up or disaggregation of gestural continuities. 
We can see how this disaggregating technique functions in another duet, one that I will refer to, 
for lack of a better title, as “leaning towards.” The “leaning towards” phrase is revelatory, for it 
contains gestures that we recognize as meaningful (part of a legible vocabulary of “intimate” 
human gestures) but that suddenly become deprived of their context, shifting us into that “abyss” 
toward which Cunningham directs his viewers. In “leaning towards,” a man and a woman lean 
toward each other until they balance precariously only a mere centimeter apart. Poised in relevé, 
they execute a hinge in parallel, back to back. The male dancer twists his upper body to the side, 
keeping his hips straight ahead, then he extends his arms in the direction of the woman. Balanced 
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also in a hinge, she leans closer to him; he leans closer to her. But they never touch. It is as though 
the man were reaching out to catch the woman in her fall, a fall that never comes.  
In the context of the phrase, his gesture could easily be read as a gesture of protection. The 
moment is rich with longing and frustration, proximity and distance, all the ingredients of a 
romantic duet. An instant later, the woman abruptly stands up straight and the man repeats the 
same protective gesture—as if to catch her—but at a speed that the eye can barely register. This 
time, the gesture we registered earlier as protective, takes on a mechanical quality; it is detached 
from anything the other dancer is doing, emptied of affect and integrated into what seems to be 
an arbitrary sequence of rapid, interrupted, almost spasmodic gestures that bring the man to the 
floor. We understand at this juncture that the gesture which seemed a moment ago to be a gesture 
saturated with meaning, a “protective” gesture, has been abstracted from its earlier function—as 
were the accelerated gestures of the “twine roll.” Momentarily, we glimpse something close—but 
not identical—to a “fact in dancing,” an element in a taxonomy of such “facts,” part of an alphabet 
or gamut of possible moves. Isolated and abstracted, “to lean toward” seems to mean little more 
than “to lean toward.”  
But a question remains: Can a gesture be entirely liberated from a context to reveal itself as “fact”? 
To answer that question we need to consider the “shape” of the “fact” and how that shape comes 
to appear. On one level, we might define the shape that phenomenalizes the fact as the peculiar 
orientation the fall takes when inserted into a continuity—here, when the hinge appears first as 
part of a flowing protective gesture, then suddenly abruptly as part of a chain of broken-up gestural 
bits. This orientation can be considered the first order of shaping, the degree zero of choreography 
as a time-based art. But this shape, inflected to be sure by its place in a continuity, does not actually 
exist until it has been executed by an individual dancer. That dancer also contributes to “the further 
fact” that modifies—and in modifying actualizes—the “fact in dancing.” The dancer, that is, brings 
to the now oriented fact-shape not simply a momentum and a rhythm but also an emotional color 
or mood. Finally, in addition to the shape the “fact” takes within the continuity and the singular 
dancer’s performance of it, there is the scenography, the “presentation context” that ineluctably 
influences the way the oriented, performed fact-shape will be perceived. 
Given that for Winterbranch Cunningham opted for such a highly charged presentation context, it 
is highly unlikely that he believed the dance was just about “falling” or that ultimately he wanted it 
to be interpreted as such. His careful directions to Rauschenberg and his attempt to preserve the 
original scenographic details of the work during Events indicate that an interpretative frame for 
the movement mattered to him a good deal. The historical context of Winterbranch helps explain 
why this might have been so. The period of the 1960s was one in which dance works addressed in 
increasingly explicit ways contemporary political events. By 1964, spectators would have been 
particularly alert to allusions in modern dance to scenes of violence: The United States had just 
entered into the war in Vietnam in 1961, and 1964 in particular was a year of escalating violence, 
both in the air and on the ground. (The Gulf of Tonkin attack was conducted on August 2, 1964.) If 
Cunningham wanted at that very moment to display the simplicity of “facts in dancing,” he made 
very little effort to guarantee that simplicity in Winterbranch. Far from attempting to suppress 
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associations with recent and current events, he allowed them to multiply. The black costumes, the 
rugs that serve as stretchers, the lighting evocative of surveillance strobes—all these elements 
converge to amplify the mood of menacing violence that the public couldn’t but apprehend. Even 
at the level of the danced gestures themselves, which accelerate over the course of the dance until 
they are performed at a frenetic, break-neck speed, Cunningham seems to have been working with 
far more than “the idea of bodies falling” (Vaughan 1997, 137).  
In addition, there is much evidence to suggest that “falling” carried many personal and literary 
associations that Cunningham continued to explore throughout his career. His “Choreographic 
Notes” are full of allusions to H. C. Earwicker (Here Comes Everybody), the hero of James Joyce’s 
Finnegans Wake who, let us recall, dies of a fall. There is no reason to exclude the possibility that 
Cunningham associated the “fact” of falling with literary figures, historical events, religious symbols, 
and personal preoccupations, and that all of these associations are present in the piece.. In any 
case, the cultural associations of the act of falling are never far from the surface of Winterbranch. 
And how could it be otherwise? Falling is 
without doubt the most symbolically 
weighted physical action that exists.26 It is 
by no means clear, then, that the “fall,” as 
a gesture, could be revealed, or even 
approached, as just a “fact.” 
As if to bring the point home, Cunningham 
produced with the photographer Robert 
Propper a series of studio stills of 
Winterbranch in the late 1960s that 
underscore the mortuary, religious, and 
even pornographic implications of falling. 
Studio shots are in general an untapped 
but important source of information about 
Cunningham’s dances, for they indicate 
how he wanted the dance to be publicized, 
emblematized, and recalled. Those taken 
by Propper are particularly eloquent. In 
figure 4 we see Cunningham lying prone in 
his black tube, a flashlight protruding 
strangely from the wrap, thus suggesting a 
curious displacement—yet lingering 
presence—of the erotic drive.  
At no point in the dance does the male 
dancer lie in the position Cunningham 
assumes for Propper’s photograph. 
However, near the middle of the piece, a 
Fig. 4: Merce Cunningham, Winterbranch, photograph by 
Robert Propper (c. 1964–1970)] 
Fig. 5: Julia Carnicer dragged off by Marco Merenda in Merce 
Cunningham’s Winterbranch (screenshot from video of 
2016 performance attributed to Lyon Opera Ballet). 
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woman, lying still and prone on her back, is indeed wrapped in one of the black carpets and 
dragged offstage by a male partner (see fig. 5). 
The studio still thus captures something central to the piece, not “falling,” but rather the state of 
“having fallen,” the weight of the stilled body as a material object that, when presented on the 
stage, implies a narrative, a dramatic past (“having fallen”). The question is, then, whether the ethics 
of Cunningham’s dance should be located in what he consistently represented as his refusal of 
symbolism, a resistance to culturally over-determined meanings, or whether instead his ethics 
inhere in both the movement and the presentation context, a set of choreographic and staging 
decisions that at once confirm those cultural meanings and put them to the test? 
Part V. Conclusion: Winterbranch and the Ethics of Gesture 
As in the example Agamben provides of the pornographic gesture suddenly interrupted to expose 
its mediality, so too the gestures in Winterbranch expose their mediality, their quality as movement 
support, while nonetheless retaining their connection to a frame, a context, that suggests a way to 
interpret them. At times, Cunningham seems to want to leave that frame behind, to remind us that 
the frame is a frame (not the “thing” itself), and even to claim that it is ethical—or at least 
emancipatory—to do so. And yet, I doubt Cunningham ultimately believed that it is either ethical 
or emancipatory to seek to leave all frames behind, to suppress all “particular forms” or “shapes,” 
to expose the dancing “fact” as such. That would mean neglecting to make a new continuity of the 
fragmented, disaggregated gestures with which he worked (and he always emphasized with his 
dancers the need to discover, in their own bodies, that new continuity); it would mean suppressing 
the independence of the individual dancer who provides the dynamic, the “shape,” the emotional 
color; it would mean removing all scenographic choices and rejecting all studio stills in an effort to 
keep the movement clean of context. If Cunningham sometimes leaned in that direction, 
Winterbranch is clearly not an example of that tendency. 
Carolyn Brown hits the mark when she refers, in the passage quoted earlier, to “the ethos of 
Winterbranch: darkness, foreboding, terror, devastation, alienation, doom” (2007, 477). 
Cunningham must have intuited that in 1964 it was time to produce a more topical piece, to expose 
the fact that falling bodies are eloquent, they are not just “facts” to be manipulated or carted away. 
Winterbranch suggests that because we are human, even simple shifts in weight can speak, can 
have something to say—even if it is simply that the body is in danger of being hurt. In that sense, 
Winterbranch is from beginning to end a meditation on the body as a sensate, living organism 
subject to injury. The pulley- and piston-like figures underscore the fragility of the dancers as they 
lift and set one another down. The make-up Rauschenberg devised for the dance points to the 
element of risk: the black smudges under the eyes of the dancers at once protect them, literally, 
from the blinding lights and suggest that vulnerability; the black smudges recall to spectators the 
fact that the dancers, as sensate beings, require protection. And this sense that dancers require 
protection characterizes Cunningham’s approach to dance in general. He is known to have 
adjusted his choreography—even if chance derived and supposedly fixed—to prevent one dancer 
from colliding with another, or to better control a lift. Choreography was always, for him, a 
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manifestation of care as well as an unfolding of the seemingly impossible permutations suggested 
by chance. Thus it is not surprising that elements of care are built into his technique. When I spoke 
to two of the dancers cast to perform the phrase “leaning towards,” Chiara Paperini and Tylor 
Galster, I learned that they were both experiencing pain in their lower backs while performing the 
hinge.27 Trained largely as classical ballet dancers, they were not used to executing the kind of off-
center hinges that are a primary building block of Cunningham’s technique and choreographic 
vocabulary. During the rehearsals Goggans, a seasoned Cunnngham teacher as well as dancer, 
advised Paperini and Galster to make use of the muscles of the abdomen to support the lower 
back in the hinge (as all Cunningham-trained dancers learn in technique class). The care the 
dancers had to exercise to protect their backs while performing the hinge must be considered a 
significant part of the actualization of the dancing “fact,” a component of its “shape” as performed. 
It is precisely this aspect of the actualization that constitutes what is gestural in the gesture: a 
sensitivity to the body as a support, as a lived support. If Agamben and Cunningham share an 
interest in the suspension of “communication” in favor of “communicability,” if both view that 
suspension as opening the ethical dimension, Cunningham adds a further element to which he, as 
a choreographer and dancer, is acutely sensitive. That element is the dancer’s own experience—
as a medium, a support for meaning, but also as a person living and shaping that support-ness, 
that “media character,” on a stage.  
The gesture in “leaning toward” that I interpreted as protective demands focused concentration on 
the part of the dancer: she must tighten the muscles of the abdomen, straighten the lower back, 
and draw the sacrum in. To some extent, this skillful use of the muscles becomes automatic over 
time; yet the effort involved always leaves a trace in performance, what I have called elsewhere 
“the affect of skill” (see Noland 2002, 120–35). This primary affect already directs the gesture 
toward the pole of expression and meaning; it gives the gesture its first shape, its first frame. 
Agamben shows some sensitivity to this layer of lived experience when he writes in “Le Geste et la 
danse” of “the dance of dancers who dance on stage, the accomplishment of their skill as dancers 
and their power to dance as power” (12; my emphasis). What Agamben refers to as the dancers’s 
“skill as dancers” is not “nakedness”; there is nothing pre-cultural or natural about it (Cunningham 
in Vaughan 1997, 86). In fact, as an example of technique it can be traced back to a very precise 
historical moment. Dance technique, or skill, is a language; it is acquired, an “accomplishment” that 
might, at times, afford an experience of the “abyss.” It is the “linguistic” element in gesture, a 
manifestation of our “linguistic nature,” or, more precisely, of our natural disposition to be 
acculturated, to acquire languages and skills, to become a vocal or gestural support for signs. To 
stage this skill in its clearest form was always one of Cunningham’s cherished goals—one could 
even say one of his ethical goals. But skill is not the same thing as mediality “as such,” or “expression 
as such,” or “communicability” as “milieu pur.” Skill is dirty and sweaty; it bears the marks not only 
of the person who attains it but also of a specific training developed at a specific point in time. As 
Winterbranch seems to insist, skill as exercised by a dancer on stage is an invitation to a reading, 
an invitation to interpretation, that, at certain historical junctures, it might be unethical to ignore. 
Winterbranch can be said, then, to occupy one pole on a large spectrum of works in Cunningham’s 
repertory, none of which—I maintain against the grain—ever achieves, or could achieve, a display 
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of energy in its “naked” form. Winterbranch incessantly, even doggedly, drags its gestures toward 
legibility, toward communication and message, even as they are interrupted, suspended, exposed 
as the instances of technique they also are. As in Agamben’s account, the two orders—or extreme 
poles of the spectrum—co-exist: the gesture is a sign (“communication”) and the gesture is a 
support, a medium (“communicability”). The ethical dimension is not opened, then, by seeking to 
suspend, to remain in an “abyss” of endless mediality understood as a thing in itself (“as such”). 
The ethical dimension is opened by recalling that suspension is itself suspended, that we are 
“condemned to meaning,” as Merleau-Ponty put it, and that communication is a betrayal but also 
a chance. If at certain moments in history it might be more ethical to press for the suspension of 
semantics, even of expression, at others it might be more ethical to emphasize the semantic and 
expressive weight a gesture can support. There is ultimately no one way for art to be ethical, nor 
one way for it to be political.28 It is impossible to ensure that a communication will be successful, 
just as it is impossible to ensure that “nothing” will be communicated at all. If the stage can display 
anything, it is that fact. 
1 That Winterbranch was indeed a controversial work is confirmed by the reviewers who saw it and the dancers 
who danced in it. See, for instance, Arlene Croce (1968): audiences of Winterbranch “got restless, laughed, hissed, 
yelled” (25); Don McDonagh (1970): “He shocked a dance audience with his first solo recital in New York in 1944, 
then later with ‘Sixteen Dances for Soloist and Company of Three’ in 1951, and over a decade later in 1964 with 
‘Winterbranch’” (33). See also Carolyn Brown (2007): “Without question Merce’s work was the most controversial 
of the season” (59).  
2 David Vaughan indicates that the last full performance of Winterbranch was in 1974 (see 1997, 293). 
3 Agamben (1999), thinking of Aristotle, calls this “linguistic nature” our “factum loquendi.” 
4 As far as I know, Agamben has published only one essay (1997) on a particular choreographer: Hervé Diasnas. 
5 See Noland (2009) for a discussion of André Leroi-Gourhan’s Gesture and Speech and Marcel Mauss’s “Techniques 
of the Body.” 
6 Gesture is thus to be understood as the alternative to an “image,” a “reification and obliteration of a gesture”. 
See Lucia Ruprecht’s brilliant consideration of gesture as continuum versus gesture as arrest (2015), with which 
the present essay is in dialogue.  
7 All translations are my own. It was thus published the same year as the Italian version of “Notes on Gesture” as 
“Note sul gesto,” in Trafic, 1992. 
8 See “Notes on Gesture” where Agamben describes how a gesture is “stiffened and turned into a destiny” (53), or 
where he speaks of the “mythical rigidity of the image” (54).  
9 The passage reads: “It has precisely nothing to say because what it shows is the being-in-language of human 
beings as pure mediality” (Agamben 2000, 58); or elsewhere: “gesture, having to express Being in language itself, 
strictly speaking has nothing to express and nothing to say other than what is said in language—gesture is always 
the gesture of being at a loss in language” (Agamben 1999, 78). 
10 That “ethics,” “politics,” and “gesture” all share a common semantic and philosophical space in Agamben’s writing 
is verified by a quick glance at “Notes on Politics,” which ends with an italicized sentence we have already read in 
“Notes on Gesture” (57); Agamben just replaces the word “gesture” with the word “politics”: “Politics is the exhibition 
of a mediality: it is the act of making a means visible as such” (2000, 115–116); original emphasis. Agamben is drawing 
from Walter Benjamin's notion of politics, presented in "What is Epic Theater?" (first version), as the act of making 
appearance appear. 
Notes 
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11 Feeling and Form was translated into Italian in 1956 and 1970. Langer quotes Mary Wigman’s “The New German 
Dance”: “The shape of the individual’s inner experience [...] will also have the unique, magnetic power of 
transmission which makes it possible to draw other persons, the participating spectators, into the magic circle of 
creation” (1953, 23). Another possible source is Walter Benjamin’s Notes aux Tableaux Parisiens, which Agamben 
cites in “Pour une éthique du cinéma” (1992).  
12 Agamben’s understanding of the relation between gesture and verbal language could be fruitfully compared to 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s comments on the “geste linguistique” (1945, 216–7). 
13 Agamben is alluding to Stéphane Mallarmé’s “Mimique”: “un milieu, pur, de fiction” [a milieu, pure, of fiction] 
(2003, 179). Citing loosely, Agamben removes the comma between “milieu” and “pur.” 
14 Cunningham makes some of his clearest statements about audience reception in these interviews, which were 
first published in France in 1980 and thus were probably recorded around 1979. “I don’t think what I do is non-
expressive,” he states, “it’s just that I don’t try to inflict it on anybody, so each person may think in whatever way 
his feelings and experience take him” (Cunningham and Lesschaeve 2009, 106).  
15 Jill Johnston wrote in 1963, for instance, that “Cunningham’s dances are still beyond the general public because 
he doesn’t give the public anything literal to hold onto. His dances are all about movement, and what you see in 
them that relates to your common experience is your own business and not his” (1963, 10). Likewise, Marcia Siegel 
wrote in 1971 that Cunningham “refuses to assume a metaphorical or illusionary intent. In other words, his 
dancing is not about something else” (1971, 471). Siegel’s approach changed over time, but her early appraisals 
were shared by many, including Roger Copeland who wrote 1979 that Cunningham’s work is “virtually devoid of 
‘expressive’ or symbolic elements” (1979, 26); see also Susan Leigh Foster (1986). For a subtle approach to 
expression in Cunningham, see Mark Franko (1992).  
16 On Stéphane Mallarmé’s “milieu pur” as a problematic notion for dance, see Frédéric Pouillaude (2014, 118–21). 
17 Variations V (1965). For Collage (1952), working with untrained performers, Cunningham made a gamut of simple 
task gestures.  
18 Cunningham began working on Winterbranch in 1963. The dance constitutes the final chapter in a four-part 
series on the seasons that he began almost a decade earlier: Springweather & People (1955); Summerspace (1958); 
Rune (the original title of which was Autumn Rune) (1959); and Winterbranch (1964). For a more detailed account of 
how the dance was made, see Noland (forthcoming). 
19 See also “Choreography and the Dance”: “I am more interested in the facts of moving rather than my feelings 
about them” (Cunningham 1970, 181). 
20 Other dances of the 1960s were studies in one of the eight “facts in dancing”: Summerspace (1958), for instance, 
is based on an exploration of the “Turn.”  
21 Speaking of RainForest Cunningham affirms: “Yes, it’s a character dance and since such a dance is made 
specifically on a given body, its flavor changes sharply when some other dancer takes over the part” (Cunningham 
and Lesschaeve 2009, 113). 
22 A reviewer of Benjamin Millepied’s 2013 reconstruction of Winterbranch remarks on the “urban” noise and the 
“headlights” that sweep the stage but does not mention disasters or holocausts (2013). Audience members I 
interviewed at the March 2016 performance in Lyon compared Winterbranch to a scene of post-nuclear disaster. 
23 Robert Rauschenberg and Jasper Johns were both present at Allan Kaprow’s 18 Happenings in 6 Parts in 1966; 
even earlier they kept abreast of works by Jean Tinguely, George Maciunus, and others (see Lussac 2004).  
24 Winterbranch was performed in a few other Events without the original scenography (1974; 1978); however, the 
fact that Cunningham later made the choice to retain it indicates his awareness of a possibility that extends to all 
his works—their integrity as performances, as statements or mood pieces. 
25 The crawling, wriggling figure returns at the end of the dance; a group of five dancers simultaneously fall to the 
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ground then leave the stage crawling on their back without the use of their hands, their bodies covered almost 
entirely by one of the black rugs. 
26 The history of dance offers ample evidence that the fall has played a primary role in the development of several 
modern dance techniques: Doris Humphrey based much of her choreographic practice on two central actions, 
“fall and recovery”; Laban was fascinated by the body’s weight; and Graham explored the effects of gravity on 
movement. Given the importance of the fall in the history of dance, it is not surprising that Cunningham would 
eventually take it up as a theme.  
27 A “hinge” requires a dancer to balance on the balls of feet, heels held off the floor, while bending at the knee 
and keeping the back in line with the hips and shoulders. A twisted hinge, à la Cunningham, requires the dancer 
to simultaneously twist the upper torso toward the side while maintaining the hips straight in relation to the knees. 
28 See Rancière (2009) for a pertinent reflection on the politics of meaning in art. 
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